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CITY EMPLOYMENT RESIDENCY REQUIREMENTS
In Ector v. City of Torrance1 a city ordinance which required all
city employees to be or become residents of the city within six months
of appointment was held unconstitutional because it inhibited an
employee's freedom to travel.2 Plaintiff had worked as a city librarian
for three years, but had never become a Torrance resident. The court
described the freedom to travel beyond the boundaries of the city for
residential purposes as a fundamental constitutional right which re-
quired a compelling governmental interest for a classification that
restricted that right.3 The court concluded that no reason had been
advanced to justify the classifications involved in the Torrance or-
dinance.,
The result in the Ector case is not very surprising. A similar or-
dinance was struck down by the New Hampshire Supreme Court in
Donnelly v. City of Manchester,5 and a durational residency require-
ment was held unconstitutional in Sokol v. Civil Service Commission.0
Yet the Ector case is illustrative of the divergent judicial attitudes
toward city residency requirements for employment resulting from
Shapiro v. Thompson.7 In that case, the United States Supreme Court
struck down durational residency requirements for welfare benefits.
The Court held that the requirements violated fourteenth amend-
ment equal protection by infringing on the constitutional right to
travel without a compelling governmental interest to justify the in-
fringements. 8 This decision applied the test of strict equal protection
to situations involving the right to travel. 9
1. -Cal. App. 3d-, 104 Cal. Rptr. 594 (Dist. Ct. App. 1972) (on appeal to
Supreme Court of California).
2. Id. at-, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 598.
3. Id. at-, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 596, 598.
4. Id. at-, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 598.
5. 111 N.H. 50, 274 A.2d 789 (1971).
6. No. 72 C 252 (1) (E.D. Mo., Dec. 29, 1972).
7. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
8. Id. at 634-38
9. See generally Note, Shapiro v. Thompson: Travel, Welfare and the Constitu-
tion, 44 N.Y.U.L. Rav. 989 (1969).
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I. THE APPLICABLE TEST
Traditionally, equal protection was used to prevent arbitrary classi-
fications by considering only whether the purpose of the classification
was properly within the state's power, and whether the classification
was reasonable in light of that purpose.'0 As quoted in Krzewinski v.
Kugler:"
"The constitutional safeguard is offended only if the classification
rests on grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the
State's objective .... A statutory discrimination will not be set
aside if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify
it.-r
Under this "reasonable" standard, courts generally refused to look
deeply into the purpose of the residency requirements for city em-
ployment.13
Shapiro affected residency requirements by recognizing their in-
hibiting impact on the right to travel, which the Court held to be a
fundamental constitutional right.14 Secondly, the Court dictated that
an inhibiting effect on the right to travel must be evaluated accord-
ing to "strict" equal protection, which requires any classification that
10. Note, Shapiro v. Thompson: A New Approach Under the Equal Protec-
tion Clause?, 6 CALIF. WESTERN L. REv. 179, 180-81 (1969).
11. 338 F. Supp. 492 (D.N.J. 1972).
12. Id. at 497 (citations omitted). See generally Comment, Constitutional Law-
Equal Protection-Residency Requirements, 21 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 571 (1970).
13. See, e.g., Marabuto v. Town of Emeryville, 183 Cal. App. 2d 40, 6 Cal.
Rptr. 690 (Dist. Ct. App. 1960); Williams v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 383 Mich. 507,
176 N.W.2d 593 (1970); Berg v. City of Minneapolis, 274 Minn. 277, 143 N.W.2d
200 (1966); Kennedy v. City of Newark, 29 N.J. 178, 148 A.2d 473 (1959);
Salt Lake City Fire Fighters Local 1645 v. Salt Lake City, 22 Utah 2d 115, 449
P.2d 239, cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969).
14. 394 U.S. at 630. See United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966).
The distinction between the right to interstate travel in Shapiro and the right
to intrastate travel (as is usually involved in the city residency requirement
cases) was considered in two subsequent federal court cases. In King v. New
Rochelle Municipal Housing Authority, 442 F.2d 646 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 863 (1971), the court decided that the use of the term "interstate" in
Shapiro reflected only the state-wide enactments involved there. "It would be
meaningless to describe the right to travel between states as a fundamental pre-
cept of personal liberty and not to acknowledge a correlative constitutional right
to travel within a state." Id. at 648. See also Cole v. Housing Authority, 435
F.2d 807 (1st Cir. 1970). For a discussion of the conflicting views of Justices
Harlan and Warren on the origin of the right to travel and their importance in
the interstate-intrastate distinction see Note, Residence Requirements After
Shapiro v. Thompson, 70 COLUM. L. REv. 134, 138-39 (1970).
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penalizes the exercise of a fundamental constitutional right to be
shown to promote a compelling governmental interest or be struck
down as unconstitutional.n
The Shapiro test for residency requirements was not as readily
applied in the area of city employment as it was in cases involving
voting rights,6 bar membership,'7 and other eligibility requirement
situations.' s In several subsequent city employment cases, state courts
refused or neglected to insist upon compelling governmental inter-
ests.1 9 The Supreme Court of New Hampshire20 finally applied the
test of Shapiro and held that an ordinance requiring residency for
all classified city employees was invalid as to school teachers because
it required a surrender of the fundamental right to travel and live
where one wishes without any compelling public interest shown to
justify the restriction.2'
Any fears that strict equal protection would be the end of all city
residency requirements for employment were soon allayed by the Fed-
eral District Court of New Jersey in Krzewinski v. Kugler22 when the
application of the same strict equal protection test employed in Don-
nelly resulted in upholding an ordinance as justified by a compelling
governmental interest in promoting police-community relations.23
Consistent with the split of the two preceding cases, the application
of the strict equal protection test in Ector made the decision fairly
easy. No justification was shown for a residency requirement that
inhibited a librarian's right to travel.24 Could any justification have
been shown? To answer this question it is necessary to examine the
15. 394 U.S. at 634. See also Krzewinski v. Kugler, 338 F. Supp. 492, 497-98(D.N.J. 1972).
16. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972).
17. Keenan v. Board of Law Examiners, 317 F. Supp. 1350 (E.D.N.C. 1970).
18. See generally Symposium-Durational Residency Requirements, 6 SUFFOLK
U.L. Rnv. 565 (1972).
19. See Detroit Police Officers Ass'n v. City of Detroit, 385 Mich. 519, 190
N.W.2d 97 (1971); Williams v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 383 Mich. 507, 176
N.W.2d 593 (1970); Hattiesburg Firefighters Local 184 v. City of Hattiesburg,
263 So. 2d 767 (Miss. 1972); Jackson v. Firemen's and Policemen's Civil Serv.
Comm'n, 466 S.W.2d 412 (Tex. Civ. App. 1971).
20. Donnelly v. City of Manchester, 111 N.H. 50, 274 A.2d 789 (1971).
21. Id. at 52, 274 A.2d at 791.
22. 338 F. Supp. 492 (D.N.J. 1972).
23. Id. at 499.
24. -Cal. App. 3d at-, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 598.
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possible governmental interests in the requirement, and what classi-
fications might be justified by compelling interests. The court in
Ector explained that all the traditional equal protection cases need
to be re-examined in light of Shapiro:
[N]o determination was made [in earlier cases] as to whether
the municipality had sustained the burden of establishing not
only that it had a compelling interest which justified the enact-
ment but that the distinctions drawn by the enactment were
necessary to further its purpose.25
II. JusT FicATiONS
A justification that is probably only applicable to durational resi-
dency requirements is the city's contention that residency for a period
prior to employment will enable the applicant to become more
familiar with the city and therefore be better qualified for the job.
This argument may have some relevance for a legislator whose job
is representing his community,26 but it has not been seriously ad-
vanced in the classification of standard civil servants. This argument
was made by defendant in support of the durational residency ordi-
nance in Sokol27 but that court agreed that such arguments had been
found less than compelling in Dunn v. Blumsteins8 and Keenan v.
Board of Law Examiners,"5 cases involving residency requirements
for voting and for bar examinations. In Dunn, the Supreme Court
noted that this argument should surely fall under the constitutional
proposition that the government cannot choose the way of greater
interference with constitutional rights if there are other ways to
achieve its goal.z0
A justification for residency requirements that was accepted only in
New Jersey was the belief that public employment was not a right,
but a privilege for the government to bestow.3' It is doubtful that
25. Id.
26. State ex rel. Gralike v. Walsh, 483 S.W.2d 70 (Mo. 1972).
27. Brief for Defendant at 7, Sokol v. Civil Serv. Corem'n, No. 72 C 252 (1)(E.D. Mo., Dec. 29, 1972).
28. 405 U.S. 330 (1972).
29. 317 F. Supp. 1350 (E.D.N.C. 1970).
30. 405 U.S. at 343. See Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11, 18 (1966); Shelton
v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960).
31. See Mercadante v. City of Paterson, 111 N.J. Super. 35, 266 A.2d 611(Ch. 1970), aff'd, 58 N.J. 112, 275 A.2d 440 (1971); Kennedy v. City of Newark,
29 NJ. 178, 148 A.2d 473 (1959).
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any court would now subscribe to the proposition that public em-
ployment is a privilege which may be conditioned upon a surrender
of a fundamental constitutional right.32
A related justification, the so-called "public coffer" theory was fairly
popular under the traditional equal protection.3 This theory stated
that the city has an interest in promoting the recirculation within
the city's economy of salaries paid to the civil servants. The court in
Krzewinski said that this theory is patently unconstitutional, relying
on the rejection in Shapiro of the belief that governments may tie
economic benefits to the municipal economy.34 The court in Donnelly
was only slightly less negative in stating that city employees earn their
salaries, and that any financial benefit to the city due to recirculation
is slight compared to an interference with fundamental constitutional
rights.35 This justification seems exceedingly weak under strict equal
protection standards.
An argument that encompasses the "public coffer" theory was ad-
vanced in Sokol where defendant referred to the "crisis of the cities"
with their declining population, abandonment of property, loss of
taxpayers, and declining tax bases.3r The court replied that the city's
interest in solving these problems is a possible basis for a residency
requirement after employment, but a durational residency require.
ment might serve to accelerate the urban decay by forcing area new-
comers to live and seek employment outside the city where there is
no waiting period for civil service jobs.37 This "crisis of the cities"
theory has not been advanced nor accepted to any extent in recent
cases.
Several justifications have relevance to specific civil servants, espe-
cially police and firemen. One that has much appeal on its face is an
emergency or proximity argument which states that the city has a
valid interest in quick availability of police and firemen in emer-
32. Donnelly v. City of Manchester, III N.H. at 52, 274 A.2d at 791-92.
Accord, Krzewinski v. Kugler, 338 F. Supp. at 498-99.
33. See Kennedy v. City of Newark, 29 N.J. 178, 148 A.2d 473 (1959); Salt
Lake City Fire Fighters Local 1645 v. Salt Lake City, 22 Utah 2d 115, 449 P.2d
239, cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969).
34. 338 F. Supp. at 498 n.4.
35. 111 N.H. at 52-53, 274 A.2d at 792.
36. No. 72 C 252 (1) at 6.
37. Id.
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gencies. 8s The court in Krzewinski rebutted this argument's appli-
cability to city residence by pointing out that geographical proximity
in an emergency cannot be logically equated with municipal borders,
and that a time or radius computation would better satisfy the gov-
ernmental interest." The court also pointed out that in New Jersey,
cities can call the on-duty forces of a nearby municipality for aid.40
In evaluating the compelling nature of the interest in a time or
radius requirement it might be relevant to examine the police and
fire department records to determine how frequently off-duty officers
are called, and whether the emergency might ever require more than
the number of men available within the quick-mobilization area who
are not compelled to live there by a residency requirement.
A second specialized justification is the argument that the presence
of an off-duty officer within the city may serve to deter crime. This
has been held to be a valid justification under both the traditional
and the strict equal protection.41 Certainly the courts must recognize
that the compelling nature of this argument is also tempered by the
fact that off-duty presence cannot be equated with residency within
the municipal borders. Additionally, the court in Krzewinski rec-
ognized that this argument might not support a residency require-
ment for firemen.42
A third justification for police and firemen's residency is based on
the city's contention that it has an interest in promoting police-
community relations. This theory has also been held to present both
a reasonable and a compelling interest.4 3 According to this theory,
living in the city might promote community cooperation with law
enforcement officers, and put an end to misunderstanding and in-
38. See Marabuto v. Town of Emeryville, 183 Cal. App. 2d 406, 410, 6 Cal.
Rptr. 690, 692-93 (Dist. Ct. App. 1960); Hattiesburg Firefighters Local 184 v.
City of Hattiesburg, 263 So. 2d 767, 771 (Miss. 1972).
39. 338 F. Supp. at 499 n.6.
40. Id. at 503-04.
41. Compare Detroit Police Officers Ass'n v. City of Detroit, 385 Mich. 519,
522-23, 190 N.W.2d 97, 98 (1971) with Krzewinski v. Kugler, 338 F. Supp. 492,
500 (D.N.J. 1972).
42. 338 F. Supp. at 500.
43. See Krzewinski v. Kugler, 338 F. Supp. 492, 499 (D.N.J. 1972); Manion
v. Kreml, 131 Ii. App. 2d 374, 378, 264 N.E.2d 842, 844 (1970); Detroit
Police Officers Ass'n v. City of Detroit, 385 Mich. 519, 522-23, 190 N.W.2d 97,98 (1971); Kennedy v. City of Newark, 29 N.J. 178, 184, 148 A.2d 473, 476
(1959).
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tolerance. The city interest in this relationship seems to support a
police residency requirement. The urban riots of the sixties have
been attributed, at least in part, to lack of good police-community
relations.- Residency could not only improve communications
through "good neighbors," but it could serve a symbolic function in
eliminating disrespect for an absentee police force which governs by
day but flees to the suburbs at night.45 These arguments are some-
what inapplicable to firemen, and they are also subject to the munici-
pal borders criticism. Nevertheless, there seems to be a compelling
governmental interest in promoting police-community relations suffi-
cient to justify a bona fide residency requirement.
CONCLUSION
The future of residency requirements for city employment depends
on a clarification of Shapiro by the Supreme Court. Contrary to the
views of the California, New Hampshire, and New Jersey courts,
Shapiro is not a clear precedent for the result in Ector. Yet Shapiro
did imply the test of strict equal protection for city employment
residency restrictions." The Supreme Court in Dunn pointed out
that a durational residency requirement is tested separately from a
bona fide residency requirement, but implied that they are both
stringently tested by the compelling governmental interest standard.47
If the Supreme Court decides to weigh all residency requirements for
city employment by this standard, the continuance of durational
residency requirements for employment and the bona fide residency
requirements for other than police, and possibly firemen, seems doubt.
ful due to a lack of compelling governmental interests to justify the
classifications that infringe on the constitutional right to travel for
residential purposes.
Kenneth John Heinz
44. TH E PRESIDENT'S COBI31'N ON LAw, ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF
JUsTiCE, TASK FORCE REPORT, THE POLICE 145 (1967).
45. Id. at 166.
46. The Court stated:
We imply no view of the validity of waiting-period or residence require-
ments determining eligibility to vote, eligibility for tuition-free education,
to obtain a license to practice a profession, to hunt or fish, and so forth.
Such requirements may promote compelling state interests on the one hand
or, on the other, may not be penalties upon the exercise of the constitutional
right of interstate travel.
394 U.S. at 638 n.21.
47. 405 U.S. at 343-44.
Washington University Open Scholarship
